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Discussion: Re-solving Irrelevant
Conjunction with Probabilistic
Independence*
James Hawthorne and Branden Fitelson†
Naive deductivist accounts of conﬁrmation have the undesirable consequence that if
E conﬁrms H, then E also conﬁrms the conjunction H7X, for any X—even if X is
completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of conﬁrmation may appear to
have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that
existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several im-
portant respects. Fitelson then proposes a new-and-improved Bayesian account that
overcomes the problem of irrelevant conjunction, and does so in a more general setting
than past attempts. We will show how to simplify and improve uponFitelson’ssolution.
1. Introduction. We will begin by recalling the problem of irrelevant con-
junction. Then we describe Fitelson’s (2002) solution. And ﬁnally we show
how to improve on it.
The problem of irrelevant conjunction was originally raised as a prob-
lem for hypothetico-deductive (H-D) accounts of conﬁrmation. On H-D
accounts, E conﬁrms H relative to background K when H7K deductively
entails E (i.e., if H7K ). This leads to the following result: X E
(1) If E H-D-conﬁrms H relative to K, then E H-D-conﬁrms H7X
relative to K, for any X.
The problem with (1) is that when E conﬁrms H, any other hypothesis
X compatible with H gets a free conﬁrmational ride. Merely tack X onto
H, and E conﬁrms them together, regardless of the fact that X may be
utterly irrelevant to E in the presence of H.
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Bayesian conﬁrmation may seem to have an advantage over the H-D
account regarding irrelevant conjunctions. For, the Bayesian account does
not generally have the property expressed in (1). On a Bayesian account,
“E conﬁrms H relative to K” just means that “ ” Pr(HFE7K) 1 Pr(HFK)
for an appropriate Bayesian probability function Pr. And in lots of cases
evidence E may conﬁrm H in this probabilistic way without conﬁrming
some conjunction H7X—i.e. without also making Pr(H7XFE7K) 1
. So, Bayesianism is generally immune to the original problem Pr(H7XFK)
of irrelevant conjunction.
However, Bayesian conﬁrmation still seems to suffer from this problem
in the case of deductive evidence. That is, Bayesian conﬁrmation and H-
D conﬁrmation both satisfy the following special case of (1) whenever E
is less than certain on K—i.e. when : Pr(EFK) ! 1
(1
 ) If , then E conﬁrms H7X relative to K for any X con- H7K X E
sistent with H7K.
That is, when we have, for any X, . So, H7K X E Pr(EFH7X7K) p 1
provided X is logically consistent with H7K and is probabilistically con-
sistent with it as well (i.e. , we have Pr(H7X7K) 1 0)
Pr(H7XFE7K) p Pr(EFH7X7K)Pr( H7XFK)/Pr(EFK)
1 Pr(H7XFK).
So, Bayesians must concede that the problem persists for evidence that
is deductively entailed by H7K.
Bayesians do have some wiggle room, however. They can concede (1
 ),
but argue that in the context of deductive evidence, H simpliciter will
always be better conﬁrmed than H7X. One way to attempt to legitimate
this claim is to point out that it follows from the axioms of probability
that , and that when (and Pr(HFE7K) ≥ Pr(H7XFE7K) H7K X E
), equality only holds in the special case where Pr(H7X7K) 1 0
(since Pr(XFH7K) p 1
Pr(H7XFE7K) p Pr(XFH7E7K)Pr( HFE7K)
p Pr(XFH7K)Pr( HFE7K)).
So, in the deductive case H is always made at least as probable as
by E (relative to K), and in the interesting cases (where H 7 X
, it’s made more probable. Pr(XFH7K) ( 1)
This solution turns on reading the “E conﬁrms H1 more than H2”
relation as “H1 is more probable given E than is H2 given E.” But that
is not generally a good way to understand “conﬁrms more.” For, given
this reading, in more general cases it will often happen that “E conﬁrms
H2 more than H1 relative to K” (because ), Pr(H FE7K) 1 Pr(H FE7K) 21RE-SOLVING IRRELEVANT CONJUNCTION 507
while E actually lowers the probability of H2 () Pr(H FE7K) ! Pr(H FK) 22
and raises the probability of H1 ( ). So, the brute Pr(H FE7K) 1 Pr(H FK) 11
comparison of the relative sizes of posterior probabilities is an intuitively
unappealing way to cash out the “conﬁrms more” relation. Thus, the
proposed solution to irrelevant conjunction depends on a ﬂawed account
of “conﬁrms more.”
So, is there a better way to cash out “conﬁrms more” that gives the
desired solution to irrelevant conjunction? Several accounts of “E conﬁrms
H given K” have been proposed in the literature that provide measures
of how much E incrementally increases the probability of H, given K—
increases it over the probability of H prior to the evidence. The most
common are the ratio measure, the difference measure, and the likelihood
ratio measure:
ratio measure:
Pr(HFE7K)P r ( EFH7K)
r(H, EFK) pp;
Pr(HFK)P r ( EFK)
difference measure:
d(H, EFK) p Pr(HFE7K) Pr(HFK);
likelihood-ratio measure:
Pr(EFH7K)
l(H, EFK) p .
Pr(EF∼H7K)
It should be clear how these measures might be applied to the problem
of irrelevant conjunction. The ratio measure would have it that E conﬁrms
H2 better than H1 (relative to K) just when the ratio is larger r(H , EFK) 2
than the ratio . The difference measure says that E conﬁrms r(H , EFK) 1
H2 better than H1 (relative to K) just when the difference is d(H , EFK) 2
larger than the difference . And likelihood-ratio measure says d(H , EFK) 1
that E conﬁrms H2 better than H1 (relative to K) just when is l(H , EFK) 2
larger than . Thus, a Bayesian solution to the problem of ir- l(H , EFK) 1
relevant conjunction might be obtained if it can be shown that
is larger than where c is some appropriatemeasure c(H, EFK) c(H7X, EFK)
of incremental conﬁrmation such as r, d,o rl.
It is now well known that when each of these measures is applied to
the same issue or problem in Bayesian treatments of conﬁrmation, they
may provide divergent results. Indeed, Fitelson (1999, 2001) has exten-
sively analyzed this issue, and ﬁnds strong grounds to prefer l over other
measures. Be that as it may, what we want to know is whether the irrel-
evant conjunction problem has a Bayesian solution based on any, or all
of these measures. The Fitelson paper under discussionprovidesananswer508 HAWTHORNE AND FITELSON
to this query. Indeed, Fitelson’s answer goes beyond the call. For, Fitelson
holds, a proper Bayesian solution to the problem of irrelevant conjunction
should be directly extendable to the case of non-deductive evidence as
well. And Fitelson’s analysis applies to non-deductive cases.
2. Fitelson’s Original Solution. Fitelson suggests that a proper Bayesian
analysis of the problem of irrelevant conjunction should start by saying
what, in a Bayesian framework, it means for X to be irrelevant to the
conﬁrmation of H by E, given K. He suggests that this should mean that
X is irrelevant to H, E, and logical combinations of H and E, where
irrelevance is to be understood in the usual Bayesian sense of probabilistic
independence. Formally, the proposal is this:
Deﬁnition. Conﬁrmational Irrelevance. A is conﬁrmationally irrelevant
to B relative to K just when A and B are probabilisticallyindependent,
given K i.e., when . Pr(A7BFK) p Pr(AFK) 7Pr(BFK)
Fitelson then proves two theorems that bear on the problem of irrel-
evant conjunction for both deductive and non-deductive evidence. The
ﬁrst theorem shows that the apparent problem persists even in non-de-
ductive cases—that if E conﬁrms H, but X is conﬁrmationally irrelevant
to H, E, and H7E, then on each of the measures r, d, and l, E also conﬁrms
(i.e. incrementally raises the probability of) H7X.
Theorem 1.I fE conﬁrms H, and X is conﬁrmationally irrelevant to
H, E, and H7E (relative to background K), then E also conﬁrms
H7X (relative to K).
Fitelson’s second theorem then comes to the rescue of the Bayesian
account by showing that if E conﬁrms H, but X is conﬁrmationally ir-
relevant to H, E, and H7E, then on measures d and l (but not on r) E
incrementally raises the probability of H more than it does H7X.
Theorem 2.I fE conﬁrms H, and X is conﬁrmationally irrelevant to
H, E, and H7E (relative to background K) and , then Pr(XFK) ( 1
, where c may be either the difference mea- c(H, EFK) 1 c(H7X, EFK)
sure d or the likelihood-ratio measure l of degree of conﬁrmation
(but, c may not be the ratio measure r, since in cases of irrelevant
conjunction we will have ). r(H, EFK) p r(H7X, EFK)
This result seems quite satisfactory, but for one thing. The antecedents
of these theorems appear to be a little too strong, and perhaps less in-
tuitively compelling than we might like.
3. An Improvement on the Solution. In the deductive case the intuition
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by what it says about the evidence. Adding X to H (given K) says nothing
more about E than H (given K) already says. So, intuitively, E should
conﬁrm H7X (given K) no more than it conﬁrms H alone (given K).
Indeed, intuitively E should perhaps conﬁrm H7X less than H alone(given
K). A natural Bayesian extension of this idea about X adding nothing to
what H says about E (given K) is this:
Natural Conjunctive Irrelevance Criterion. X is an irrelevant conjunct
to H given K with respect to evidence E just in case
i.e. just when E is independent of X Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
given H together with K.
This criterion involves an intuition about probabilistic independence
that is central to Fitelson’s previous theorems, but draws on much more
intuitively direct version of the idea that X is an irrelevant conjunct. This
describes one sense in which the antecedents in Fitelson’s theorems seem
overly strong.
The antecedents of the theorems are too strong in a more literal sense
as well. For it turns out that:
i. If “X is conﬁrmationally irrelevant to H, E, and H7E” in the sense
employed in the theorems, then “X is an irrelevant conjunct to H
given K with respect to evidence E” in the sense of the Natural
Conjunctive Irrelevance Criterion just deﬁned. And the Natural
Conjunctive Irrelevance Criterion is strictly weaker than supposing
X to be conﬁrmationally irrelevant to H, E, and H7E. Furthermore:
ii. The Natural Conjunctive Irrelevance Criterion sufﬁces in place of
Fitelson’s original irrelevance conditions, to establish of the con-
sequents of the theorems.
To see that claim (i) holds, notice that Fitelson’s original independence
conditions imply that
Pr(EFH7X7K) 7Pr(HFK) 7Pr(XFK)
p Pr(EFH7X7K) 7Pr(H7XFK)
p Pr(H7X7EFK)
p Pr(H7EFK) 7Pr(XFK)
p Pr(EFH7K) 7Pr(HFK) 7Pr(XFK);
so . But Fitelson’s original condition is not Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
equivalent to the revised condition, since we can easily have cases where
while (i.e. Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)P r ( XFH7K) ( Pr(XFK)
). Consider, for example, cases where X Pr(H7XFK) ( Pr(XFK)Pr( HFK)510 HAWTHORNE AND FITELSON
is a kind of evidence statement E* (e.g. “the second toss will be heads”)
and hypothesis H is relevant to E* (e.g. H says “the coin is fair” and
), and where E (e.g. “the ﬁrst toss is heads”) is Pr(E*FH7K) ( P(E*FK)
independent of E* given H7K.
To verify claim (ii), ﬁrst observe that the following revised version of
Theorem 1 holds:
Revised Theorem 1.I fE conﬁrms H relative to K and
, then E also conﬁrms H7X relative to Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
K, where the notion of conﬁrmation is given by either the ratio mea-
sure r or the difference measure d or the likelihood-ratio measure l.
This is a simpliﬁed version of the Bayesian “bad news” theorem. In the
case of the ratio measure r it says that if Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
and (i.e. H is conﬁrmed by E given K on measure r), then r(H, EFK) 1 1
(i.e. is conﬁrmed by E given K on measure r). r(H7X, EFK) 1 1 H 7 X
For the difference measure d the revised theorem says that if
and (i.e. H is conﬁrmed by Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K) d(H, EFK) 1 0
E given K on measure d), then (i.e. H7X is conﬁrmed d(H7X, EFK) 1 0
by E given K on measure d). In the case of the likelihood-ratio measure
l the revised theorem says that if and Pr(EFH7X7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
(i.e. H is conﬁrmed by E given K on measure l), then l(H, EFK) 1 1
(i.e. H7X is conﬁrmed by E given K on measure l). l(H7X, EFK) 1 1
In spite of the bad news from Revised Theorem 1, the corresponding
revised version of Theorem 2 shows that evenontheweaker,moreintuitive
notion of irrelevance, two of the three Bayesian measures of incremental
conﬁrmation say that hypotheses are always better conﬁrmed than their
conjunctions with irrelevant alternatives.
Revised Theorem 2.I fE conﬁrms H relative to K and
and , then Pr(EFX7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K) Pr(XFH7K) ( 1
, where c may be either the difference mea- c(H,EFK) 1 c(H7X, EFK)
sure d or the likelihood-ratio measure l of degree of incremental
conﬁrmation. But, c may not be the ratio measure r, since for r, when
E conﬁrms H relative to K and , we Pr(EFX7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
have that . r(H, EFK) p r(H7X, EFK)
This revision of Fitelson’s original Bayesian resolution of the irrelevant
conjunction problem signiﬁcantly strengthens that result. Like Fitelson’s
earlier version, this resolution is not restricted to the special case of de-
ductive evidence. However, this version has the advantage of employing
a notion of an irrelevant conjunct that is precisely analogous to that in
the original deductive evidence case. It subsumes the deductive irrelevant
conjunction issue as a special case in a natural way. And, like Fitelson’sRE-SOLVING IRRELEVANT CONJUNCTION 511
original approach, this solution is more robust, more measure-insensitive,
than other suggested resolutions of the problem.
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Revised Theorem 1
Suppose that in each case, 1, 2, and 3, Pr(EFX7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
below.
1. For ratio measure r: If (i.e. H is conﬁrmed by E given r(H, EFK) 1 1
K on measure r), then
Pr(HFE7K)P r ( EFH7K)
1 ! r(H, EFK) pp
Pr(HFK)P r ( EFK)
Pr(EFH7X7K)
pp r(H7X, EFK)
Pr(EFK)
(i.e. H7X is conﬁrmed by E given K on measure r).
2. For the difference measure d: Suppose (i.e. H is con- d(H, EFK) 1 0
ﬁrmed by E given K on measure d). Then 0 ! d(H, EFK) p
,s o Pr(HFE7K) Pr(HFK)
Pr(HFE7K)P r ( EFH7K)
1 ! p
Pr(HFK)P r ( EFK)
Pr(EFH7X7K)P r ( H7XFE7K)
pp,
Pr(EFK)P r ( HFK)
so (i.e. H7X is conﬁrmed by E given K 0 ! Pr(H7XFE7K) Pr(H7XFK)
on measure d).
3. For the likelihood-ratio measure l: Suppose (i.e. H is l(H, EFK) 1 1
conﬁrmed by E given K on measure l). Then
Pr(EFH7K)
1 ! l(H, EFK) p ;
Pr(EF∼H7K)
so . This implies Pr(EF∼H7K) ! Pr(EFH7K)1 ! Pr(EFH7K)/Pr(EFK)
[because
Pr(EFK) p
Pr(EFH7K) 7 (1 Pr(∼HFK)) Pr(EF∼H7K 7Pr(∼HFK),512 HAWTHORNE AND FITELSON
so
Pr(EFK) Pr(EFH7K) p
(Pr(EFH7K) Pr(EF∼H7K)) 7Pr(∼HFK) ! 0].
Then,
Pr(EFH7X7K)P r ( H7XFE7K)
1 ! p .
Pr(EFK)P r ( H7XFK)
So we have , which implies Pr(H7XFK) ! Pr(H7XFE7K)
Pr(∼(H7X)FK) 1 Pr(∼(H7X)FE7K).
These two inequalities together yield
Pr(H7XFK)P r ( H7XFE7K)
!
Pr(∼(H7X)FK)P r ( ∼(H7X)FE7K)
Pr(EFH7X7K)P r ( H7XFK)
p 7 . [] [ ] Pr(EF∼(H7X)7K)P r ( ∼(H7X)FK)
Thus (i.e. H7X is conﬁrmed by E 1 ! Pr(EFH7X7K)/Pr(EF∼(H7X)7K)
given K on measure l).
Proof of Revised Theorem 2
Suppose that and in each Pr(EFX7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K)P r ( XFH7K) ( 1
case, 1, 2, and 3, below.
1. For the case: c p r
Pr(EFH7K)P r ( HFE7K)
r(H, EFK) pp
Pr(EFK)P r ( HFK)
Pr(EFH7X7K)
pp r(H7X, EFK).
Pr(EFK)
2. For the case: Suppose E conﬁrms H relative to K. Then c p dRE-SOLVING IRRELEVANT CONJUNCTION 513
—i.e. . Then d(H, EFK) 1 0P r ( HFE7K) Pr(HFK) 1 0
Pr(EFH7X7K)Pr( H7XFK)
Pr(H7XFE7K) p
Pr(EFK)
Pr(EFH7K)
p 7Pr(H7XFK) [] Pr(EFK)
Pr(HFE7K)
p 7Pr(H7XFK). [] Pr(HFK)
So,
d(H7X, EFK) p Pr(H7XFE7K) Pr(H7XFK)
Pr(HFE7K)
p Pr(H7XFK) 7 1 [[ ] ] Pr(HFK)
Pr(H7XFK)
p 7d(H, EFK) [] Pr(HFK)
p Pr(XFH7K) 7 d(H, EFK) ! d(H, EFK)
(unless , in which case they’re equal). Pr(XFH7K) p 1
3. For the case: Suppose E conﬁrms H relative to K. Then c p ll (H,
—i.e. . Notice that EFK) 1 1P r ( EFH7K)/Pr(EF∼H7K) 1 1
Pr(EF∼X7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
(since and ). Also notice Pr(XFH7K) ( 1P r ( EFX7H7K) p Pr(EFH7K)
that (otherwise , so Pr(∼HF∼(X7H)7K) ! 10 p Pr(HF∼(X7H)7K)
0 p Pr(H 7 ∼(X7H)FK) p Pr(H 7 ∼XFK)
p Pr(∼XFH7K) 7Pr(HFK),
so , which contradicts our assump- Pr(XFH7K) p 1 Pr(∼XFH7K) p 1
tion that ). Pr(XFH7K) ! 1
Now
Pr(EF∼(X7H)7K)
p Pr(EFH 7 ∼(X7H)7K) 7 Pr(HF∼(X7H)7K)
 Pr(EF∼H 7 ∼(X7H)7K) 7 Pr(∼HF∼(X7H)7K)
p Pr(EFH7K) 7Pr(HF∼(X7H)7K)
 Pr(EF∼H7K) 7 Pr(∼HF∼(X7H)7K).514 HAWTHORNE AND FITELSON
So,
Pr(EF∼(X 7 H) 7 K)
p Pr(HF∼(X 7 H) 7 K)  Pr(∼HF∼(X 7 H) 7 K)
Pr(EF(X 7 H) 7 K)
Pr(EF∼H 7 K)P r ( EF∼H 7 K)
7 1 . [] Pr(EFH 7 K)P r ( EFH 7 K)
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